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exchanges. By its efforts and interest in producing a vigorous program of
self-regulation with governmental aid in the over-the-counter industry the
Commission has shown that it considers the unorganized markets as important
in their special capacity as are the exchanges in that portion of the securities
business which they serve. The Maloney Act offers a splendid chance for
the whole over-the-counter business to create a vigorous self-regulatory scheme
under which it can proceed" 6 not only to terminate exchange encroachments
upon trading which would normally go over-the-counter but also to obtain
for itself a maximum amount of all the securities business which for one
reason or another is not peculiarly suited to exchange trading.
SUSPENSION OF CORPORATE CHARTER FOR
NONPAYMENT OF FRANCHISE TAX
ALL STATES have statutes requiring that domestic corporations pay fran-
chise fees and file annual reports. Many of these acts provide in addition
that noncompliance calls for suspension or forfeiture of the corporate char-
ter.' Though varied in form, these laws have in common the double objective
of securing revenue for the state and exercising control over corporate
116. In a speech before the Investment Bankers' Association, Henry 11. Egly, Chief
of the Securities Association Division of the S. E. C., suggested the following outline
for the program to be carried out by the proposed registered associations:
"1. Financial responsibility which includes such aspects as (a) Keeping and preserva-
tion of books and records; (b) Filing of financial statements: (1) Nature thereof;
(2) Treatment; (c) Inspection of books and records; (d) Establishment of sonic ratio
between dealer's indebtedness and capital; (e) The question of margin transaction by
brokers and dealers for own account; (f) Filing of information in respect to current
underwriting commitments and net positions; (g) Reporting of loans partly or wholly
unsecured.
2. Safeguarding the funds and securities of customers. (a) Hypothecation of securi-
ties carried for customers' accounts. (b) Commingling of customers' funds.
3. Safeguards against unreasonable profits and commissions.
4. The problem of manipulation and proper provisions for stabilization.
5. Quotations. (a) Adequacy and public dissemination. (b) Fictitious quotations.
(c) Nominal quotations.
6. Regulation of market letters, brokers' circulars and other advertising.
7. Salesmen. Qualifications, training, supervision and compensation.
8. Discretionary accounts. (a) Management by broker. (b) Management by dealer,
9. Participation by association in enforcement of commission rules.
10. Technique of trading, deliveries, settlements, etc."
S. E. C. Release (December 7, 1938).
1. See e.g., CAL. GEr. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8488, § 32; Micu. Comr. LAWS
(Mason, Supp. 1933) § 10135-87; Tz-x. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 7091, 7092.
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affairs. The problems which their interpretation and enforcement raise,
never academic, are intensified during periods of economic stress.2 When
drastic retrenchment is necessitated, payment of the franchise tax is osten-
sibly easily dispensable, not one of the immediate requirements of a going
business. Especially to less sizable corporations does the levy loom large
in proportion to total disbursements. 3 In many cases an organization fighting
for survival may have little choice but to fail to remit the tax. If such cor-
porations, or others which have inadvertently omitted payment of the levy, 4
continue to do business, or, having ceased active operation, attempt to resume
activities upon the return of more prosperous times, complex and vital ques-
tions arise as to rights and liabilities during suspension and upon reinstate-
ment.5 Cases interpreting the various statutes present a startling patchwork
quilt of logic, yet it is possible to discern certain basic assumptions and pre-
dilections running through the decisions. This comment attempts to collect
and correlate the varied rulings, and to isolate the principles which have
motivated courts in their determinations.
The first predisposition, perhaps the most important in terms of the results
eventually attained, is self-evident. Here, as elsewhere, forfeitures are not
favorites of the law.0 The effect of this idea upon the flexible, directive ter-
minology employed by the varied statutes in fixing the penalty for violation
has been to produce uniformity of interpretation. Whether the statute
speaks in terms of "forfeiture," 7 "dissolution," 8 or "suspension," 0 the ma-
jority of courts hold that there is at most but a suspension of the corporate
powers.' 0 Even where the opinion talks in terms of forfeiture, the results
2. In -Michigan in two years (1931-32) over 300D corporations forfeited their char-
ters for nonpayment of the franchise tax. By 1936 the number had dropped to 975.
Swearingen, Corporations Whose Charters Have Bcconc U'oid (1937) 16 Mic. S. B. J.
149. In New York, 250,000 corporations have been stricken from the corporation index
since 1929. N. Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1938, p. 39, col. 5.
3. The taxes are rarely a flat rate on the franchise, but not infrequently the scale
of gradation is such that the small corporation is penalized. See (1937) 16 Mien. S. B. J.
580.
4. This evidently occurred in San Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo, 84 Cal. App. 627,
258 Pac. 666 (1927) and Murphy v. Wheatley, 102 lid. 501, 63 Ad. (2 (1905). For an
instance of' refusal to pay because of dispute over the amount, see Turner v. Western
Hydro-Electric Co., 241 Mich. 6, 216 N. W. 476 (1927).
5. See generally, Swearingen, loc. cit. mipra note 2; (1937) 16 Mica. S. B. J. SS0.
6. Enunciations of this policy are legion. See e.g., Briggs v. Cape Cod Canal Co.,
137 fass. 71, 72 (1884); Galveston Ry. v. State, 81 Tex. 572, 596 (1S91); 6 Co o;
ConaoRATioNs (8th ed. 1923) § 637; 16 FLET C ER, CoRpoRATio's (Pen. ed. 1933) § 8035;
2 KExT's Co =TARums (13th ed. 1884) 306.
7. Tax. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925.) art. 7091.
& OMax. CODE AxN. (1930) § 25-250.
9. CA. GE . LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8488, § 32.
10. Mathews v. Life Ins. Co. of Detroit, 279 N. NV. 858 (Mich. 1933); Deschutes
Co. v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928) ; Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v.
Dildy, 92 S. -,V. (2d) 318 (Te. Civ. App. 1936). For the minority view see Young
Construction Co. v. Dunne, 123 Kau. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927).
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are often those of suspension.1 Reluctant to hold that failure to comply
with certain stipulated conditions could ipso facto forfeit the charter, courts
have consistently maintained that a forfeiture may only be declared in pro-
ceedings instituted for that purpose by the state.1 2 The legislative power
to provide for spontaneous forfeiture is generally conceded. 13 Yet in the
more unusual instances in which the statutory language is apparently con-
clusive of automatic forfeiture, it has nevertheless been declared that whether
the facts exist which warrant the application of the provision is a question
for judicial determination. 14 Until the state acts in quo warranto, the cor-
porate charter may be merely suspended.15 The right of revivor which
numerous statutes grant upon the payment of back taxes and certain fines
has often been the straw seized upon as conclusive of a legislative intent not
to work absolute forfeiture.1" As a final indication of the disinclination
to impose this drastic penalty, the courts, lending the otherwise plastic lan-
guage a hard, unyielding side, exact the strictest compliance by the state
with the statutory provisions before the forfeiture can be made effective.lT
A second basic assumption of a majority of courts is that the familiar
analogy drawn between corporate existence and that of an individual is, in
this situation, no longer adequate; it is obvious that the suspended corpora-
tion is neither "alive" nor "dead" in the familiar judicial meaning of these
11. Klamath Lumber Co. v. Bamber, 74 Ore. 287, 145 Pac. 650 (1915). When pre-
cise terminology is not required, courts often use forfeiture and suspension interchange-
ably.
12. Cluthe v. Railway, 176 Ind. 162, 95 N. E. 543 (1911) ; State c.x rcl. City Council
v. Railroad, 51 S. C. 129, 28 S. E. 145 (1897) ; Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward, 30 W.
Va. 43, 3 S. E. 227 (1887).
13. See Brooklyn Steam Transit Co. v. Brooklyn, 78 N. Y. 524, 529 (1879) ; State
ex rel. City Council v. Railroad, 51 S. C. 129, 132, 28 S. E. 145, 146 (1897) ; Young Con-
struction Co. v. Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 180, 254 Pac. 323, 325 (1927). But see Reichert
v. Ellis Ferry Co., 184 Ky. 150, 154, 211 S. W. 403, 405 (1919).
14. In Frosts' Lessee v. Frostburg Coal Co., 24 How. 278 (U. S. 1860) the Supreme
Court held a statute not to be self-executing even though it read "the corporate powers
and privileges shall cease and determine." And in Atchafalaya Bank v. Dawson, 13 La.
497 (1839) recourse to the courts was held necessary though the statute read: ". . . the
charter shall be ipso facto forfeited and void . . ." For a complete collection of the
cases, see 16 FLETcHE, CoEpoRarioNs (Perm. ed. 1933) § 7988.
15. At least one state treats the nonpayment of the tax as a cause of forfeiture
which the state may enforce, with a suspension of the charter until the forfeiture has
been judicially determined. Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21,
52 S. W. (2d) 56 (1932) ; Bunn v. Laredo, 213 S. W. 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; (1933)
11 TEX. L. RET. 250.
16. Bokel v. Zitnik, 93 Colo. 565, 27 P. (2d) 753 (1933) ; State c.r. ret. 3owen v.
Superior Court, 135 Wash. 315, 237 Pac. 722 (1925).
17. Ferguson Fruit & Land Co. v. Goodding, 44 Idaho 76, 258 Pac. 557 (1927);
Woodward Hardware Co. v. Fisher, 269 Mo. 271, 190 S. W. 576 (1916); Deschutes Co.
v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928). See also Elliott's Coal Co. v. State Corp.
Comm., 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 353 (1918) (forfeiture refused for failure to notify cor-
poration that its tax was due) and Veil v. Richardson, 224 Mo. App. 990, 24 S. W. (2d)
175 (1930) (suspension refused because of incorrect entry by Secretary of State).
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terms. The fact that the corporate charter is to some intents void and yet
the corporation can be reinstated has necessitated a new terminology. Courts
have, as a result, talked in terms of "suspended animation."' 8 This hybrid
concept, a sort of myopic forfeiture, is a stranger to orthodox legal doctrine,
but, as will be demonstrated later, it has permitted the attainment of desir-
able results in certain situations.
LIABILITIES OF SUSPENDED CORPORATION
Creditors' Rights: Since a corporation which has omitted payment of
franchise taxes is almost always in precarious financial circumstances, the
rights of its creditors, if suspension does occur, become a paramount issue.
Early decisions compared the expiration or forfeiture of the corporate char-
ter to the death of an individual.1 All actions by20 and against 2' the cor-
poration were thought to cease immediately. A judgment obtained after
"death" against such a corporation could be collaterally attacked.2 The
extinction was complete and instantaneous unless there was a statutory pro-
vision to the contrary.23 To alleviate the inequities engendered by this rule,
legislatures long ago enacted statutes the general purport of which was to
make the directors of a dissolved corporation trustees of the corporate rights,
powers, and property. They were vested with authority to wind up affairs
and distribute assets of the organization.2 4 Some states provided for a con-
tinuation of the corporation itself for a limited period, but only for the
18. Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Bryson, 79 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935);
Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Su-
perior Ct., 188 Cal. 393, 205 Pac. 446 (1922).
See also Swearingen, supra note 2, at 152. The author points out that the suspended
corporation is without power to exercise its normal functions, yet since it is not dis-
solved, it exists in the eyes of the law.
19. In Greely v. Smith, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5748, at 1075 (C. C. D. Me. 1845) Mr.
Justice Story said: "I cannot distinguish between the case of a corporation and the
case of a private person dying pendente lite . . . and therefore any suit pending against
it at its (the corporation's] death abates by mere operation of the law." Quoted vith
approval in National Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. 609 (U. S. 1874). See also Lyon-Gray
Lumber Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 247 S. W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
20. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257 (1927); American
Transportation Co. v. Swift & Co., 22 F. (2d) 457 (S. D. N. Y. 1927); Young Con-
struction Co. v. Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927).
21. Sinnott v. Hanan, 214 N. Y. 454, 108 N. E. 85 (1915); Shepherd v. Kress
Box Co., 154 Va. 421, 153 S. E. 649 (1930); Hawley v. Bonanza Queen Co., 61 Wash.
90, 111 Pac. 1073 (1910).
22. Garrett v. Pilgrim Mines Co., 47 Idaho 595, 277 Pac. 567 (1929).
23. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257 (1927); Lyon Gray
Realty Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 269 S. NV. 80 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
24. See e.g., CoNN. Ga.x. STAT. (1930) § 3471. For interpretation of similar stat-
utes, see Pease v. Rathbun Jones Co., 243 U. S. 273 (1917); etropolitan Rubber Co.
v. Place, 147 Fed. 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Stiles v. Laurel Fork Oil & Coal Co., 47
IV. Va. 838, 35 S. E. 986 (1900).
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purpose of winding up its affairs, and not for the transaction of any new
business.25 The end was identical in both instances.
A few statutes, which in reality provide for forfeiture even though a
right of revivor is extended and which, contrary to the general tendency
previously indicated, have been so construed,2  vest either in the directors
as trustees,27 or directly in the corporation,28 the power to terminate the
business. In such cases, the powers and liabilities of the corporation become
identical with those arising upon dissolution, and have received wide atten-
tion under that head. 29 Similarly, if the statute expressly permits suits
against the suspended corporation, 30 few questions arise. 31 But if, as usually
happens, no provision is made for preserving rights of action, the problem
presents difficulties and has elicited various responses. There is often in-
voked a new assumption-that suspension is a penalty imposed by the state
for noncompliance with a revenue or regulatory measure.3 2 Sentient courts
thus conclude that since the penalty is intended to be operative solely against
the corporation, the law should not serve as its protector by abating cred-
itor's actions then pending or preventing the latter from instituting suit.
Since the corporation is in a state of legal though somnolent existence during
suspension, it is not to be relieved of just debts which accrued prior to that
time.33 Under this rule a judgment would not be subject to collateral attack
25. Typical is DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 2074. See Pomeroy's Lessee v. State Bank,
1 Wall. 23 (U. S. 1863); Nome & Sinook Co. v. Ames Mercantile Co., 187 Fed. 928
(C. C. A. 9th, 1911); Hasselman v. Japanese Co., 2 Ind. App. 180, 28 N. E. 207 (1891).
26. American Surety Co. v. Great White Spirit Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 526, 43 Ati. 579
(1899); Package Sales Corp. v. Cincinnati Orchards Co., 24 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 313
(Munic. Ct. 1922).
27. Gardiner v. Automatic Arms Co., 275 Fed. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1921); Norton
v. Steinfeld, 36 Ariz. 536, 288 Pac. 3 (1930); Four-S Razor Co. v. Guymon, 110 Kan.
745, 205 Pac. 635 (1922).
28. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 54 F. (2d) 367 (D. Md. 1931); Division
Ave. Realty Co. v. McGough, 274 Mich. 163, 264 N. W. 328 (1936); Deschutes Co. v.
Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928).
29. For general discussion of the effect of dissolution on pending suits, see 16
FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §§ 8147, 8148.
30. See e.g., CAL. GEN. LAWs (Deering, 1937) Act 8488, § 32, Nelson v. Marsh,
100 Cal. App. 578, 280 Pac. 695 (1929).
31. The corporation is, of course, given the right to defend, but may obtain only
defensive relief. Notice would be served as though the corporation were not suspended.
California Bean Growers Ass'n v. Lewellyn Bean Co., 228 Mich. 489, 200 N. W. 162
(1924) ; Mathews v. Life Ins. Co. of Detroit, 279 N. W. 858 (Mich. 1938).
32. The statutes are universally viewed by the courts as being penal in nature. See
e.g., Indian Protective Ass'n v. Gordon, 34 App. D. C. 553 (1910), aft'd, 225 U. S. 698
(1911); Klamath Lumber Co. v. Bamber, 74 Ore. 287, 145 Pac. 650 (1915); Deveny
v. Success Co., 228 S. W. 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
33. State ex rel. Bowen v. Superior Ct., 135 Wash. 315, 237 Pac. 722 (1925) ; Finch
v. Finch, 68 Cal. App. 72, 228 Pac. 553 (1924). Decisions under this proposition include
not only money judgments [Nathan v. American Photoplayer Co., 95 Cal. App. 320,
272 Pac. 775 (1928); Nelson v. Marsh, 100 Cal. App. 578, 280 Pac. 695 (1929)1, but
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on the grounds of non-existence of the corporate body when it was ob-
tained.34 Further, since under this theory the corporation still possesses a
modified existence as an entity, suit could be maintained only against the
corporation and not against the stockholders or directors as trustees." It is
doubtful, moreover, if any jurisdiction would permit a recovery against the
corporation for damages caused directly by the suspension of business in
obedience to the statute unless payment was withheld with the express pur-
pose of escaping contractual obligations. A minority of courts cut adrift
from the general current of authority and construe the vague terms of the
typical statute to mean that actual forfeiture is intended. 0 Actions pend-
ing against the corporation are abated, and no new suit may be instituted.=
Even in the absence of statute, a federal court has indicated that directors
or stockholders may then be sued,38 but not all state courts have followed
this lead. Needless to say, if suspension statutes are to be regarded as regu-
latory measures, the better rule appears to be to permit actions directly
against the corporation in order that suspension will not penalize creditors.
Different, but none the less difficult problems arise when a suspended
corporation continues to do business and liabilities arise after, as opposed
to before, the date of suspension. The continuation may be in wilful viola-
tion of the law,39 or in ignorance of the fact that suspension has actually
occurred. 40 Such a corporation has been held to be neither de jure nor de
facto, as there has been no colorable attempt to comply with the law. Hence
acts done by it are null and void, and no recovery may be had against it.41
The question of recourse in this situation against stockholders or directors
is apparently one of good faith. The general reluctance to hold directors
or stockholders liable as co-partners where they have no knowledge of the
foreclosure actions as well. Hazard v. Park, 294 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. Sth, 1923) ; Evers-
man v. Ray Shipman Co., 115 Ohio St. 269, 152 N. E. 643 (1926); West Park Realty
Co. v. Porth, 192 Wis. 307, 212 N. W. 651 (1927). Contra: Young Construction Co.
v. Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927).
34. Ohio Nat. Bank v. Construction Co., 17 App. D. C. 524 (1901); Farmer's State
Bank v. Brown, 52 N. D. 806, 204 N. W. 673 (1925) ; Vest Park Realty Co. v. Porth,
192 Wis. 307, 212 N. V. 651 (1927).
35. Nathan v. American Photoplayer Co., 95 Cal. App. 320, 272 Pac. 775 (1928);
Southern Land Co. v. Paulk, 99 Cal. App. 775, 279 Pae. 496 (1929); Usher v. Henkel,
205 Cal. 413, 271 Pac. 494 (1928).
36. This may be a reaction to legislative criticism of the general reluctance to per-
mit automatic forfeiture. Courts following this interpretation differ as to whether the
state dissolution statutes may then apply.
37. Hawley v. Bonanza Queen Co., 61 Wash.- 90, 111 Pac. 1073 (1910).
38. Gardiner v. Automatic Arms Co., 275 Fed. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1921).
39. Bergeron v. Belisle, 256 IMich. 225, 239 N. W. 277 (1931); Jones v. Young,
115 AXV. a. 225, 174 S. E. 885 (1934).
40. See note 4, supra.
41. Finch v. Finch, 68 Cal. App. 72, 2-8 Pac. 553 (1924); Package Sales Corp. v.
Cincinnati Orchards Co., 24 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 313 (Munic. Ct. 1922).
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actual state of affairs 42 has been extended to suspension cases.43 Where,
however, officers have continued the corporate business with knowledge of
the suspension, no such reluctance has been evinced.44 Thus where a sum
of money was given a corporation in return for a note and stock of the
company and the corporation had been suspended at the time of the trans-
action, the directors as individuals were held liable on the note.45 Similarly,
where a corporation after suspension of its charter continued in business by
agreement of its stockholders, the latter were held individually liable in a
tort action instituted by an injured employee. 40 This distinction seems hardly
to be open to criticism.
The supposedly somniferous corporation is viewed in a few jurisdictions
as having a de facto existence if it continues to carry on its business without
interruption and to undertake obligations in disregard of the order of sus-
pension.47 Under this interpretation the corporation may be sued as such
and is liable for all acts committed before or during the suspension period.48
A contract to repurchase treasury stock has been held enforceable against a
suspended corporation even though the agreement was consummated after
suspension occurred.
49
The relative merits of the contrasting views are difficult to resolve. A
judgment against a corporation which has no assets is worthless, and studies
indicate that a substantial proportion of suspended corporations find them-
selves in that unfortunate position. 0 Yet it could be argued that a creditor
42. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Gilinsky, 142 Iowa 178, 120 N. W. 476 (1909); Cen-
tral City Bank v. Walker, 66 N. Y. 424 (1876). See Dodd, Partnership Liability of
Stockholders in Defective Corporations (1927) 40 HARV. L. REV. 521.
43. Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Bliss, 132 Ala. 253, 31 So. 81 (1901). Thus an inno-
cent stockholder has been held not liable as a co-partner on a note executed in the name
of the corporation after the charter had become void. Adams v. First Nat. Bank, 294
S. W. 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
44. Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., 6 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925); Nat. Union
Bank v. Landon, 45 N. Y. 410 (1871); Jones v. Young, 115 W. Va. 225, 174 S. E. 885
(1934). See generally 1 MACHEIN, CORPORATIONS (1st ed. 1908) § 293; (1926) 14 CALIF.
L. REv. 486; (1922) 7 MINN. L. REv. 42.
45. Silvey v. Fink, 99 Cal. App. 528, 279 Pac. 202 (1929). The court held that
since during suspension the directors were without power to borrow money for the cor-
poration, execute its note, or enter into a contract for the sale of stock, the note and
subscription agreement were void and plaintiff never became owner of the stock.
46. Jones v. Young, 115 W. Va. 225, 174 S. E. 885 (1934); (1934) 41 W. VA. L.
Q. 81.
47. Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) ; (1919) 28 YALE L. 5.
604. See generally Carpenter, De Facto Corporations (1912) 25 HARV. L. Riw. 623;
Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation-A. De Facto Corporations (1907) 20 HAuV.
L. RE V. 456; Comment (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 514.
48. Bergeron v. Belisle, 256 Mich. 225, 239 N. W. 277 (1931); Sun River Co. v.
Montana Bank, 81 Mont. 222, 262 Pac. 1039 (1927); Goldstein v. Mitchell, 14 Ohio
App. 231 (1921) (contract concluded after suspension); Deschutes Co. v. Lara. 127 Ore.
57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928).
49. Fites v. Marsh, 171 Cal. 487, 153 Pac. 926 (1915).
50. See Swearingen, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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who dealt with a corporation as such should be at his peril to determine the
legal existence of the organization and estopped from recourse against di-
rectors or stockholders. 51 The former argument is perhaps the stronger.
There seems to be no compelling reason why recourse should not be per-
mitted against officials who have knowingly continued corporate activity in
violation of law. Civil liability would penalize them as individuals; the state
in proper proceedings could punish the corporation itself.0
2
Stockholders' Rights: The relation of the suspended corporation to its
stockholders has been adjudicated in but few aspects. But the underlying as-
sumptions are ostensibly the same as in the case of suits by creditors. It has
been held that since the state is primarily concerned with regulation and rev-
enue,5 3 any stockholder might revive the corporation by payment of the fran-
chise tax and penalties.54 Suit by him on behalf ofp or directly against the
corporation 6 might then follow. But stockholders' rights are limited by those
of the corporation. Hence in jurisdictions where the suspended corporation
can not maintain suit, stockholders are likewise precluded when the corpora-
tion is the real party in interest.57 Where a solvent corporation failed to
pay its tax in order to effect a fraudulent purpose, a minority stockholder
has been denied the right to use the non-payment as an indication of insol-
vency and sue for the appointment of a receiver. s On the other hand, courts
have been commendably liberal in permitting stockholders' suits against the
directors for an accounting after non-payment of the tax."0 In general, the
stockholders of a suspended corporation may maintain an action if its pur-
pose is to prevent or correct fraud.G0
Rights of the State: Whether the state may, upon revivor, assess the tax
for the period during which the corporation has been suspended has never
51. It has been held that a party dealing with a suspended corporation as a cor-
poration will be estopped from denying its existence at the time the transaction oce-
curred. Ferguson Fruit and Land Co. v. Goodding, 44 Idaho 76, 25S Pac. 557 (1927);
Ohio Nat. Bank v. Construction Co., 17 App. D. C. 524 (1901).
52. See Eversman v. Ray Shipman Co., 115 Ohio St. 269, 277, 152 N. E. 643, 645
(1926); Adams -. First Nat. Bank, 294 S. IV. 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
53. See note 32, supra.
54. Usher v- Henkel, 205 Cal. 413, 271 Pac. 494 (1928); Southern Land Co. v.
McKenna, 100 Cal. App. 152, 280 Pac. 144 (1929).
55. Southern Land Co. v. McKenna, 100 Cal. App. 152, 280 Pac. 144 (1929).
56. Usher v. Henkel, 205 Cal. 413, 271 Pac. 494 (1928). In those jurisdictions
where the corporation may be sued even though suspended, this mode of procedure wvould
of course be superfluous.
57. A judgment obtained in such a manner may be collaterally attacked. Smith v.
Lewis, 211 Cal. 294, 295 Pac. 37 (1930).
58. Reade v. Broadway Theatre Co., 99 N. J. Eq. 282, 132 Atl. 477 (Ch. 1926).
59. Estel v. Midgard Inv. Co., 46 S. W. (2d) 193 (Mo. App. 1932). It has been
held that in a suit to compel an accounting, the corporation is an indispensable party.
Watts v. Vanderbilt, 45 F. (2d) 96S (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). One can only speculate as
to the effect of this decision in those jurisdictions in which the corporation cannot be
sued.
60. Gardiner v. Automatic Arms Co., 275 Fed. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1921).
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been adjudicated. In an analogous but not identical situation-the iniposi-
tion of a franchise tax during bankruptcy or receivership-courts are hope-
lessly divided.6' The cases diverge along two entirely irreconcilable theories.
One group holds that the tax is on the right to "be", and as the corporation
at the time of assessment is practically if not actually dissolved, there can
be no taxable franchise.62 The other maintains that the tax is on the right
to "do," i.e., upon the exercise of the franchise and not upon the franchise
itself. Thus if the receiver or trustee continues the ordinary business of the
corporation, the tax may be assessed.63 A recent Supreme Court decision,
limited to extremely narrow grounds, did not completely dispel the fog that
obscures the rulings.64 The court held that the federal courts were bound
to follow the state interpretation, which in that particular instance held that
the tax was on the exercise of the privilege conferred by the sovereign.06
An intimation by the late Mr. Justice Cardozo that this was a preferable
interpretation may, however, serve as an admonition to state as well as fed-
eral courts that the tax should be on the right to "do."" 0 Neither of the
above principles would seem to apply directly in suspension cases, as theoreti-
cally the corporation can not act and in legal contemplation it exists only
for certain purposes, such as exercising the right of revivor. Thus it is
neither "being" nor "doing," and logically no tax should be imposed during
the period of suspension. Even if the corporation does continue its ordinary
business, it is believed that the state's remedy should lie rather in enforcing
the suspension statute and exacting appropriate penalties by direct pro-
ceedings.
67
61. The cases are collected in (1922) 18 A. L. R. 700.
62. Ohio v. Harris, 229 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916), cert. denied, 242 U. S. 034
(1916) ; Johnson v. Johnson Bros., 108 Me. 272, 80 Atl. 741 (1911). For the contrary
view that the franchise is not legally terminated and the privilege of exercising the
franchise remains, even though practically useless, and that hence the tax is assessable,
see In re Malko Milling & Lighting Co., 32 F. (2d) 825 (D. Md. 1929) ; State v. Brad-
ley, 207 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595 (1922).
63. Bright v. Arkansas, 249 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); In re Detroit Proper-
ties Corp., 254 Mich. 523, 236 N. W. 850 (1931). Conversely, when the receiver does
not carry on the corporate business, the tax may not be imposed. Greenfield Savings
Bank v. Commonwealth, 211 Mass. 207, 97 N. E. 927 (1912).
64. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334 (1932). See Comment (1932) 30
MIcH. L. REv. 1094; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 471; (1932) 30 Micu. L. Rnv. 1346.
65. The rule was enunciated in In re Detroit Properties Co., 254 Mich. 523, 236
N. W. 850 (1931). But it was disregarded by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Michigan
Trust Co. v. Michigan, 52 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
66. Thompson v. Louisiana, 98 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), and Lowden v.
State Corporation Commission, 76 P. (2d) 1139 (N. Mex. 1938), are indicative that this
warning may not go unheeded.
67. See cases cited supra note 52. It could be argued that one purpose of the mione-
tary penalties was to replace the revenue lost through nonpayment of the ta. duriu,
the suspension period.
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RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION
Privilege of Maintaining Suit: Statutes regulating the rights of the cor-
poration and limiting corporate activities during suspension are sparse in
detail. Typical are those laws which simply provide, without further elabora-
tion, that the corporate powers are terminated until revived by the fulfill-
ment of specified conditions. The important question of the right of the
corporation to sue in its own name for affirmative relief then becomes purely
one of judicial interpretation. The answers are varied. One jurisdiction has
indicated that the legislature may not constitutionally prohibit access to the
courts on a cause of action arising before suspension.0 4 The same theory,
with a slightly different shading, underlies the ruling that a suspended cor-
poration may not be denied admission to the courts when the suit is incident
to winding up the business. 9 The rationale of this decision apparently is
that the provision for forfeiture is absolute, but that its penal or regulatory
nature must not dtny to any organization the privileges incident to ordinary
dissolution proceedings. And there is, of course, a wide latitude in deter-
mining what winding up the business may entail. Suits have been enter-
tained under this theory for the eviction of trespassers from land acquired
before suspension,"0 to collect rents,71 and to enforce the obligations of
promissory notes. -2
A third approach is illustrated by the ruling that a suit instituted by a
suspended corporation had sufficient substance to permit the substitution of
the directors as party-plaintiffs, 73 even though the corporation itself was
barred from court. This result was reached in apparent disregard of a stat-
ute which, though it permitted actions originated by corporate officials, ex-
pressly denied the privilege of suit to the corporation itself. Through use
of the "suspended animation" concept the court endowed the corporation
with a sort of diaphanous existence and arrived at a desirable result. Still
a fourth set of decisions prohibits the maintenance of any suit.74 Jurisdic-
tions adhering to this rule apparently view suspension as complete forfeiture
68. Stephens County v. McCammon, 40 S.W. (2d) 67 (Texc. Comm. App. 1931).
But cf. Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21, 52 S. AV. (2d) 55
(1932). That a suspended corporation may sue at any time see State ex rel. Bowen v.
Superior Ct., 135 Wash. 315, 237 Pac. 722 (1925).
69. McKee v. Standard Minerals Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 97, 156 At. 193 (1931); Fer-
guson Fruit & Land Co. v. Goodding, 44 Idaho 76, -58 Pac. 557 (1927); cf. Four-S
Razor Co. v. Guymon, 110 Kan. 745, 205 Pac. 635 (1922).
70. Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21, 52 S. W. (2d) 55
(1932).
71. Division Ave. Realty Co. v. McGough, 274 Mich. 163, 264 N. W. 328 (1936).
72. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 54 F. (2d) 367 (D. Md. 1931).
73. Norton v. Steinfeld, 36 Ariz. 536, 288 Pac. 3 (1930); Weekes Grain & Live-
stock Co. v. Ware & Leland, 99 Neb. 126, 155 N. W. 233 (1915).
74. Garrett v. Pilgrim Mines Co., 47 Idaho 595, 277 Pac. 567 (1929); Havens &
Co. v. Apartment House Co., 97 Neb. 639, 150 N. W. 1011 (1915); Meldman Cartage
Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 271 Mich. 304, 259 N. XV. 905 (1935).
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and all rights of action pending at the time suspension occurs are abated.5
Nor may directors bring or continue suit where the corporation is the real
party in inter6st.7 6 A judgment obtained by either the corporation or its
officers is void and subject to collateral attack even after reinstatement has
.occurred.
7
Through these varied decisions one unifying thread may perhaps be drawn.
In general, if the cause of action arose before suspension or could be called
incident to winding up the business, the suit will be allowed unless explicitly
prohibited by statute. Conversely, if the cause of action arose during sus-
pension or is not incident to winding up the affairs, suit is precluded. The
unifying factor which permits this hesitant generalization is undoubtedly the
concept previously outlined, that the primary purpose of suspension is to
penalize the corporation for its default. Courts impose the maximum pen-
alty which can be inflicted without denying to the corporation the essential
privilege of dissolution.
Title Transfers and Assignments: The assumption that the corporation
is in a state of "suspended animation" is plainly evident in cases dealing with
transfers of titles and assignments. Perhaps here more than elsewhere is the
peculiar concept used as a means of achieving equitable ends. A suspended
corporation may serve as repository of title,78 and, however illogical it may
appear upon a cursory inspection, a deed transferred by a suspended cor-
poration, unless otherwise provided by statute,70 is valid.80 Mechanics liens
and mortgages executed after suspension are prior liens even as against
creditors' claims matured before cancellation of the corporate charter. 81 If,
however, a statute vests title in the directors as trustees during suspension,
then of course a conveyance by the corporation is void.8 2 Conversely, in
those jurisdictions where title remains in the corporation, a purported con-
veyance by the directors is a nullity.8 3 The latter holding again illustrates
75. Young Construction Co. v. Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927); Ila-
math Lumber Co. v. Bamber, 74 Ore. 287, 145 Pac. 650 (1915); Hawley v. B onanza
Queen Co., 61 Wash. 90, 111 Pac. 1073 (1910).
76. Gulf Coast Shrine Club v. Clarkson, 74 S. W. (2d) 1048 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
Nor may a receiver bring suit until revivor is effected. Young Construction Co. v.
Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927).
77. Smith v. Lewis, 211 Cal. 294, 295 Pac. 37 (1930).
78. Deschutes Co. v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928). This is directly op-
posed to the ruling in the case of dissolved corporations, which may not accept deeds
or conveyances. Klorfine v. Cole, 121 Ore. 76, 254 Pac. 200 (1927).
79. Usher v. Henkel, 205 Cal. 413, 271 Pac. 494 (1928) (statute provided all acts
during suspension were void).
80. Landis Bros. Co. v. Lawrence, 104 Cal. App. 499, 286 Pac. 177 (1930); Fergu-
son Fruit and Land Co. v. Goodding, 44 Idaho 76, 258 Pac. 557 (1927).
81. Eversman v. Ray Shipman Co., 115 Ohio St. 269, 152 N. E. 643 (1926).
82. Weil v. Richardson, 224 Mo. App. 990, 24 S. W. (2d) 175 (1930).
83. Southern Land Co. v. Paulk, 99 Cal. App. 775, 279 Pac. 496 (1929); Southern
Land Co. v.. M eKenna, 100 Cal. App. 152, 280 Pac. 144 (1929); Bokel v. Zitnik, 93
Colo. 565, 27 P. (2d) 753 (1933).
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the suspended animation theme, since were it not for this helpful concept,
the corporation itself would be powerless to act, but conveyance by the
directors would be valid.
84
A corporation may not defeat the penal purpose of a suspension statute
or the restrictions imposed on it by assigning causes of action to third par-
ties."' If it does so, in those jurisdictions which deny the suspended cor-
poration admission to the courts, the assignee is also precluded from suit.80
Similarly, a judgment received before suspension may not be assigned for
execution if by statute all acts of the corporation during sus'pension are
void.8 7 In some jurisdictions it might be possible to present a hgical argu-
ment that such execution was but an incident of winding up the business,
hence the judgment could either be executed by the corporation or assigned.93
Bankruptcy: The federal courts have repeatedly enunciated the policy that
no state statute will be permitted to hamper or restrict the measure of pro-
tection afforded creditors by the Bankruptcy Act. The death of an insolvent
individual who has committed acts of bankruptcy prior toi the filing of a
bankruptcy petition defeats jurisdiction.80 But it has uniformly been declared
that corporations dissolved by decree of a state tribunal in quo Tearra to
proceedings are amenable to the Bankruptcy Act.00 Though the corporation
84. This principle is further extended by permitting the supendetl corporation to
pay its taxes at any time. Even where statutes expressly deny the right to transact
business during suspension, the corporation may redeem its property at a tam Eale.
Ruth v. Devany, 84 Colo. 476, 271 Pac. 623 (1928).
85. Bengel v. Kenney, 126 Cal. App. 735, 14 P. (2d) 1031 (1Q32).
86. Bengel v. Kenney, 126 Cal. App. 735, 14 P. (2d) 1031 (1932). Becaue of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, a suspended corporation may not bring suit in a foreign
state even though the suspension decree has not been entered in the state in vwhich the
action is brought. And as a suit by the corporation may not he entertained, an assign-
ment of a cause of action is void and the assignee may not recover thereon in a suit
in a foreign state. Siegal v. faryland Casualty Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
87. Panzer-Hamilton Co. v. Bray, 96 Cal. App. 460, 274 Pac. 769 (1929). But cf.
First -Nat. Bank v. Little, 6 S. W. (2d) 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
88. This argument apparently prevailed in Tradesmen's Nat. Ban: & Trust Co. v.
Johnson, 54 F. (2d) 367 (D. Md. 1931).
89. it re Fackelman, 248 Fed. 565 (S. D. Cal. 1918); Adams v. Terrell, 4 Fed. 796
(C. C. W . D. Tex. 1880). For complete discussion see Lyon Rtalty Co. v. Vilburn
Realty Co., 56 F. (2d) 187, 183 (D. Md. 1932).
90. In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 76 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935); Capitol Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); cf.
Vassar Foundry Co. v. Whiting Corp., 2 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). See (1935)
35 COL. L. REv. 108; (1935) 48 HaV. L. REv. 676; (1936) 22 V. L. Rrv. 465. This
result follows despite pleas in abatement or motions to quash filed on the grounds that
the corporation no longer existed and hence the court had nothing over v.hich it could
acquire jurisdiction. 1n re Adams & Hoyt Co., 164 Fed. 4859 (N. D. Ga. 1903). In In re
Booth's Drugstore, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 95 (W. D. Va. 1937), the court held that a peti-
tion in bankruptcy could be maintained against the corporation for an act committed
subsequent to the revocation of its charter. (1938) 44 W. V.A. L. Q. 219. The fact that
a receiver has been engaged for some time in winding up affaits of the corporation is
immaterial to exercise of federal power. Austin v. Thomas, 78 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A.
6th, 1935), (1935) 20 MARQ. L. REv. 42.
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is legally non-existent or "dead," it has a qualified existence for the purpose
of being declared a bankrupt. It is not surprising to find courts even more
willing to extend the bankruptcy privilege to corporations which are merely
suspended, as this presents fewer logical hurdles than dissolution.' The
concept of qualified existence and the principle that suspension is not intended
to destroy the rights of creditors are again available.
-2
In view of the virtual ldnanimity of the many decisions on this point, two
recent cases require comment. In the first, a suspended corporation attempted
to file under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. It was held that since a sus-
pended corporation was incapable of carrying on business, the principal part
of the corporate income could not be derived from agriculture, hence the
requisite factor for jurisdiction under Section 75 was lacking 3 The court
was careful to dismiss the action without denying the corporation all rights
under the Bankruptcy Act, but the case is indicative that difficulty may be
encountered in qualifying for the rehabilitation sections of the Act. In the
second case, the Supreme Court denied the right of a corporation to enter
voluntary bankruptcy two years after dissolution for non-payment of a
franchise tax, even though at the time of the petition the corporation was
defending a suit in another court and could thus claim a qualified existence.01
There was a vigorous dissent, and the decision was expressly limited to the
precise issue, the court reserving the question as to the propriety of a petition
by a creditor as opposed to the attempt at voluntary bankruptcy. The case
is likely to be limited to the narrow issue decided. Even if it should be held
to be controlling for dissolved corporations, it is extremely doubtful if the
principle will be extended to corporations in a state of "suspended aninia-
tion." 95 Nor does there seem to be any reason for denying to suspended
corporations or their creditors the protection afforded by the Act. Rather
has it been convincingly argued that the latter was intended to be given a
broad inclusionS0
91. Old Fort Improvement Co. v. Lea, 89 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (lapse
of 9 years since appointment of receiver and 18 months since suspension for non-payment
of tax) ; it re Pacific Alloy & Steel Co., 299 Fed. 952 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924); In re Dou-
ble Star Brick Co., 210 Fed. 980 (N. D. Cal. 1913).
92. It has also been argued that in bankruptcy proceedings the court takes hold of
the res rather than the person of the bankrupt. it re Double Star Brick Co., 210 Fed.
980 (N. D. Cal. 1913); (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 465, 466.
93. McLaughlin Land & Livestock Co. v. Bank of America, 94 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938).
94. Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Bldg. Co., 302 U. S.
120 (1937), (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 546, (1938) 22 MINm. L. Rnv. 721, (1938) 24
VA. L. REv. 322.
95. Whether suspended corporations may reorganize under Chapter X is speculative.
It has been argued that whereas for jurisdiction in bankruptcy only the undistributed
assets of a corporation are necessary, for reorganization a live corporate entity is essen-
tial. See (1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 676.
96. See, e.g., Weiristein, Corporations Amenable to Section 77B (1935) 83 U, or
PA. L. REv. 853; (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 322, 323.
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Revivor: The outstanding attribute of a suspended corporation is the pos-
sibility of revivor. tMost suspension statutes provide for revivor or reinstate-
ment of the corporation by the payment of back taxes and compliance with
other penalties.0 7 They are divided as to whether the application for reinstate-
ment must be within a fixed time. In interpreting the Texas statute requiring
revivor within six months, the court, calling the statute one for the purpose
of securing revenue, permitted revivor after the expiration of twenty-three
years.9 8 More usual is the Missouri ruling which deems the right of revival
abandoned after a suspension of five years.09 Once dissolution proceedings
have been begun by the state following a period of suspension, the corpora-
tion has no right to be reinstated and may not by proceedings in mandamus
compel the state to revive it.10 Before the institution of such proceedings
and before the lapse of a reasonable time, the right to reinstatement may be
regarded as absolute if the prescribed conditions are fulfilled.10 '
Upon fulfillment of the requisite conditions, the corporation is restored to
its former status under the old charter. °2 Its existence is no longer subject
to collateral attack.10 3 Hence any method of revival that satisfies the state,
or an appearance of compliance with the law, is conclusive upon the world.
Only the state in quo varranto proceedings may question the finality of the
reinstatement. 0 4  Under this doctrine anyone may pay the tax and secure
the reinstatement of the corporation 0° so long as the state does not object.
Thus it has been held that a stockholder may bring about the revival in order
to maintain suit in the corporation's behalf, even though the stock was ob-
tained after suspension.100 And a minority of the directors may authorize a
revival, with payment from the corporate funds, regardless of the fact that
the charter requires acquiescence by a majority' 07 Because it would be im-
97. For typical statutes see note 1, sipra. For their application and interpretation,
see Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) ; Rossi v. Claire, 186 Cal. 544,
199 Pac. 1042 (1921); Ruth v. Devany, 84 Colo. 476, 271 Pac. 623 (1928); Derchutes
Co. v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928).
98. Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21, 52 S. W. (2d) 56
(1932), (1933) 11 TEx. L. REv. 250.
99. Estel v. Midgard Inv. Co., 46 S. NV. (2d) 193 (Mo. App. 1932); cf. Boyce V.
Hinlde, 139 Wash. 164, 245 Pac. 927 (1926).
100. Metropolitan Building Corp. v. Ryan, 141 Kan. 521, 41 P. (2d) 1002 (1935).
101. But see Rossi v. Claire, 186 Cal. 544, 199 Pac. 1042 (1921) (the accrual of
property rights to a stockholder after suspension will prevent revival).
102. Talcott Land Co. v. Hershiser, 134 Cal. 748, 195 Pac. 653 (1921); Shien v.
Lipkin, 105 Pa. Super. 127, 159 AtI. 198 (1932) ; Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee
Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21, 52 S. IV. (2d) 56 (1932).
103. McKee v. Standard Minerals Corp., IS Del. Ch. 97, 156 Ati. 193 (1931) (a
private person may not question the corporate reinstatement) ; Laird v. Pan-American
Lumber Co., 237 S. IV. 1047 (Mo. App. 1922) (nor may stockholders).
104. McKee v. Standard Minerals Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 97, 156 Atl. 193 (1931).
105. See note 53, supra.
106. Southern Land Co. v. McKenna, 100 Cal. App. 152, 20 Pac. 144 (1929).
107. McKee v. Standard Minerals Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 97, 156 Atd. 193 (1931).
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possible to form a new corporation in this manner, the revived corporation
is not, in the eyes of the state, a new or different organization.10 Hence, as
a general rule, a suspended corporation does not lose its name.109 If, how-
ever, during suspension another corporation has adopted the same name or
one so similar as to be deceiving or confusing, the revived corporation may
not claim a right to the former name, but must assume a new one.11 An
extremely slight change in the title so that it remains substantially like the
old one, even though no corporation has assumed the former name, will not
defeat revivor, and a corporation which applies for revivor with this defect
may be reinstated as the identical corporation which existed prior to sus-
pension."1
A corporation which is reinstated may maintain suit on a cause of action
arising before suspension."12 There are some indications that the statute of
limitations will not run against a plaintiff corporation during the period of
suspension, but this is certainly open to serious question and has not been
definitely settled.113 Possibly it should be held to run against the corporation,
but not against the person who by statute or judicial interpretation is unable
to maintain suit against the corporation during the period of suspension.
This would serve the intent of the statutes in penalizing the corporation, but
would not militate against the rights of innocent parties.
When suit by a suspended corporation is dismissed because of statutory
prohibition against the maintenance of an action during suspension, suit
upon the same cause of action after reinstatement will not be prejudiced.114
This is consonant with the principle that suspension will not be construed
in a manner to impair any action, defense, or right which might accrue upon
revival. Similarly, upon reinstatement a corporation may be heard to appeal
from a judgment taken before suspension."15 And, since the corporation is
in a state of "suspended animation," suspension during a suit will not, in
108. Talcott Land Co. v. Hershiser, 184 Cal. 748, 195 Pac. 653 (1921); Pippin v.
McMahon Bros., 33 Del. 42, 130 At. 37 (1925). For the logical difficulties encountered
when a corporation treats suspension as forfeiture and reincorporates, see Turner v.
Western Hydro-Electric Co., 241 Mich. 6. 216 N. W. 476 (1927).
109. Talcott Land Co. v. Hershiser, 184 Cal. 748, 195 Pac. 653 (1921).
110. Southern Land Co. v. McKenna, 100 Cal. App. 152, 280 Pac. 144 (1929), Dut
the fact that another corporation has assumed the name of the suspended corporation
will not defeat revivor.
111. Pippin v. McMahon Bros.. 33 Del. 42, 130 Atl. 37 (1925).
112. Karnes v. Flint, 153 Wash. 225, 279 Pac. 728 (1929).
113. The rulings on the subject have been by indirection. It was indicated in Fineh
v. Finch, 68 Cal. App. 72, 228 Pac. 553 (1924) that the statute would run as usual. See
also Comm'r of lnt. Rev. v. Bryson. 79 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935). But in Deq-
chutes Co. v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928) the statutory period had evidently
expired prior to the institution of the suit by the corporation. And in Clegg v. Roscoe
Lumber Co., 161 S. W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) the court held that suit by a sus-
pended corporation, even though void, would toll the statute.
114. Nedau v. United Petroleum Co., 251 Mich. 673, 232 N. W. 202 (1930).
115. San Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo, 84 Cal. App. 627, 258 Pac. 666 (1927).
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the absence of statute, dismiss the action.' The suit, rather, remains dor-
mant, and upon reinstatement may be continued. In the absence of statutes
voiding all acts of a corporation during suspension, the magic of reinstate-
ment has been held to validate actions which occurred during the suspension
period.117 This rule, plus an underlying estoppel, applies with full force to
persons dealing with a suspended corporation in its corporate capacity, and
a contract concluded under these conditions is properly enforceable by either
party upon revivor.
CONCLUSION
It has been implicit in this discussion that the problems involving suspend-
ed corporations will increase in number and complexity. As the state continues
to cast about for methods of control more effective but less drastic and
cumbersome than forfeiture, it is inevitable that new problems will be pre-
sented. Judicial indecision born of statutory indefiniteness obscures the
underlying purpose of the enactments. Too often equities of a single situa-
tion or analogies from distantly related fields give a mistaken directive force
to a hurriedly drawn statute. To assist the courts in understanding the legis-
lature and to aid the legislature in achieving its desired control, it is suggested
that statutes containing the following provisions might be enacted:
1. Absolute and automatic suspension of the right of a cor-
poration to do business as a penalty for noncompliance with
the specified requirements.
2. Continuation of the corporate entity for the purpose of
defending suits. The corporation should be denied affirma-
tive relief either in the way of a defense or in an inde-
pendent action.
3. Liability of the organization as a de facto corporation for
acts committed and contracts consummated during sus-
pension.
4. Filing of bankruptcy petitions during suspension by any
creditor or by the corporation itself.
5. Rights of revivor for a limited time. Revivor should re-
store the corporation to its former status and validate acts
committed during suspension as well as restoring rights
existing before suspension.
6. Forfeiture of the corporate charter without judicial pro-
ceedings by an entry on the records of the proper official
if no revivor were attempted within the specified time.
7. Application of the regular corporate dissolution acts if
such a forfeiture did occur.
116. Jarvis v. Chapman, 110 Fla. 17, 147 So. 860 (1933).
117. Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Clegg v. Roscoe Lum-
ber Co., 161 S. W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). Where statutes provide that all acts of
a corporation during suspension are void, reinstatement does not -alidate such acts.
Van Landingham v. United Tuna Packers, 189 Cal. 353, 203 Pac. 973 (1922) (contract
invalid); Smith v. Lewis, 211 Cal. 294, 295 Pac. 37 (1930) (judgment void); Ran-
some-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 205 Pac. 446 (1922) (revival is
not retroactive).
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